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THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN
INTERNATIONAL TREATIES AND
DOMESTIC LAW: A VIEW FROM ALBANIAN
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW AND PRACTICE
Fisnik Korenica and Dren Doli*
ABSTRACT
This article addresses the issue of the relationship between
treaties and the domestic legal order of Albania. At the outset,
the article specifically questions the treaty-making and
ratification powers under the auspices of Albanian
constitutional law. The article then models the relationship
between treaties and the Albanian domestic legal order,
arguing that international treaties form part of the national
legal order and are incorporated and directly applied in the
domestic context, most of the time prevailing over inconsistent
laws.
The question of domestic constitutional review of
international treaties and the mechanisms in place to ensure
the prevalence of treaties over inconsistent domestic laws is
also addressed. The article discusses the pacta sunt servanda
principle and the bonna fidei application of international
treaties within the Albanian Constitution. Finally, the article
clarifies the relationship between international treaties and
the domestic Albanian legal order, suggesting that
constitutional justice must make use of these findings in order
to sharpen the relationship concerned. This article thus
affirms the congruous relationship between international
treaties and the Albanian domestic legal order.
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INTRODUCTION: LOCATING THE QUESTION
The relationship between international law and national
law has plagued the legal world from ancient times. One could
argue that, though an old problem, the relationship retains
relevance in the contemporary world. In light of the growing
impact of international law on both domestic and international
affairs, the search for an understanding of the relationship
between international and national legal systems becomes
essential in order to address many legal and political questions.
As such, the latter serves as a basic point of reference for this
article.
While many lawyers promote the importance of
international law, they distinguish between domestic and
international law, holding that the two systems have different
targets and intentions. This attitude contributes to the view
that international and domestic laws are independent legal
systems that do not overlap. In contrast, the vast majority of
lawyers around the world contend that international and
domestic law, though differing on occasion, coincide in almost
every aspect.1 The latter view, as a result, has raised the
question of the communication and rapport between the two
legal orders. Thus, one can argue that due to the imperative
points that assemble them, the relationship between
international law and national law should be regulated,
resolving most of the questions that arise regarding the
dominance of one over the other. In this context, the modern
drafters of constitutions face two main questions: whether
international law must be incorporated into domestic law and,
if incorporated, how to rank it within the domestic legal order.2
1 E.g., ANTONIO CASSESE, INTERNATIONAL LAW (2d ed. 2005); J. G. Starke,
Monism and Dualism in the Theory of International Law, 17 BRIT.Y.B. INT’L
L. 66 (1936). See alsoMALCOLM M. SHAW, INTERNATIONAL LAW (6th ed. 2008);
Edwin Borchard, The Relation between International Law and Municipal
Law, 27 VA. L. REV. 137 (1940); Ignaz Seidl-Hohenveldern, Transformation or
Adoption of International Law into Municipal Law, 12 INT’L & COMP. L.Q. 1
(1963).
2 See Antonio La Pergola, The Relationship Between International and
Domestic Law: Traditional Problems and New Trends, in European Comm’n
for Democracy Through Law, The Relationship Between International and
Domestic Law, Doc. No. CDL-STD(1993)005 (Sept. 15, 1993) [hereinafter Eur.
Comm’n. for Democracy Through Law, International and Domestic Law].
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In principle, most scholars agree that the relationship
between treaties and domestic law is regulated by specific
constitutional rules.3 There are those, however, who argue
that international legal precepts should always take
precedence in regards to the regulation of the relationship
between the two orders.4 In general, the question revolves
around two issues: whether international law and domestic law
should be part of a single system of law or whether
international law and domestic law should be independent of
one another. HanzKelsen, for instance, has argued that they
must be part of a single legal order, with international law
prevailing over domestic.5
In the monistic doctrine, international law and national
law always come together to form a single legal system.6 In
monist models, a ratified international treaty forms part of the
domestic legal order and is directly incorporated and often
directly applied at the national level.7 Dualism, by contrast,
views international and domestic law as two independent legal
orders. Dualist models of the relationship between international law and domestic law propose that a treaty takes
effect internationally after being signed by the head of state,
but in order for it to have sway over domestic legal affairs, the
treaty’s text must be adopted through a law of parliament.8
Though the debate between monist and dualist theories offers

3
PETER MALANCZUK, AKEHURST’S
MODERN INTRODUCTION TO
INTERNATIONAL LAW, 68–70 (7th ed. 1997); see also Antonio Cassese, Modern
Constitutions and International Law, 192 RECUEIL DES COURS [COLLECTED
COURSES] 331, 370–73 (1985).
4 A.F.M. Maniruzzaman, State Contracts in Contemporary International
Law: Monist Versus Dualist Controversies, 12 EUR. J. INT’L L. 309, 311 (2001)
(arguing that the regulation of relationship between international and
domestic law must rest with the former).
5 HANS KELSEN, GENERAL THEORY OF LAW AND STATE (Anders Wedberg
trans., 1945).
6 See generally MALANCZUK, supra note 3; SHAW, supra note 1.
7 SeeTIM HILLIER, SOURCEBOOK ON PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW (6th ed.
1998). See also SHAW, supra note 1, Francois Rigaux, Hans Kelsen on
International Law, 9 EUR. J. INT’L L. 325 (1998).
8 E.g., R. Balkin, International Law and Domestic Law, in PUBLIC
INTERNATIONAL LAW: AN AUSTRALIAN PERSPECTIVE 119 (Sam Blay et. al eds.,
1997); MALANCZUK, supra note 3, at 45; Gib van Ert, Dubious Dualism: The
Reception of International Law in Canada, 44 VAL. U. L. REV. 927 (2010).
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no permanent solutions,9 it presents the groundwork for a
logical investigation of the often fraught relationship of the
theories. Hence, though not aimed at using monism and
dualism unreservedly, one would at least apply these models in
our case to the extent logical.
The goal of this article is to explore and discuss the
relationship between international treaties and domestic law in
Albania. The article will begin by discussing constitutional
law. Other international legal issues will be explored later. In
general, the article will consider four topics: first, the treatymaking powers and the ratification procedure of Albanian
constitutional law; second, the relationship between
international treaties and domestic law, analyzing the model of
employment and model of incorporation, the question of direct
applicability, and the rank of incorporated treaties within the
domestic legal order; third, the issue of the constitutional
review of treaties, including the review of the consistency
between laws and treaties; and fourth, the question of the
principle of pacta sunt servanda. By evaluating both scholastic
and technical arguments from literature and the law,
particularly that of constitutional justice, the article will
attempt to answer the questions posed through an
investigation of the relationship between international treaties
and domestic law in Albania. In this respect, the article argues
that Albanian constitutional law and international law enjoy
an agreeable relationship.
First, however, we need to clarify the term “treaty” and
explain its position within the broader context of public
international law. For the purposes of this article, the term
“treaty” refers to a written agreement between two or more
statesentered into based on public international law.10 The
term treaty refers to everything in opposition to customary
international law. As a result, this article addresses the
relationship between international treaties and Albanian
domestic law, ignoring customary international law.
9 Carl AageNørgaard, The Implementation of International Human
Rights’ Agreements within a Domestic Legal System, in Eur. Comm’n. for
Democracy Through Law, International and Domestic Law, supra note 2.
10 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art.1(a), May 23, 1969, 1155
U.N.T.S. 331 [hereinafter Vienna Convention].
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Also, digging deeper into the question of treaty-making
powers and ratification procedures in the case of Albania
directs us to two essential authorities that regulate the issue:
the Constitution of Albania and the Law on the Making of
International Treaties and Agreements of Albania (“LMITAA”).
It is worth noting that these documents, and related
controversies arising from the discrepancies between them,
stem from the fact that LMITAAwas adopted under the
previous Albanian constitutional regime.
The new
Constitution of Albania, promulgated in 1998, however, has
recognized LMITAA’s legal effect.
TREATY-MAKING AND RATIFICATION UNDER THE
CONSTITUTION OF ALBANIA
In monist legal systems, as in Albania’s, the act of treaty
ratification produces two effects in theory: 1) it makes the
polity internationally responsible for respecting and applying
ratified treaties, and 2) it makes the polity domestically
responsible for applying the obligations from any signed
treaties.11 In contrast, in dualist legal systems, as in the
United Kingdom, the obligations of a treaty only become
domestically applicable after being adopted by the House of
Commons in the form of a law.12 Having explained the
difference between how these two systems work, we can now
discuss treaty making powers and procedures.
In the first case in point, the Constitution of Albania
states:
The ratification and denunciation of international agreements by
the Republic of Albania is done by law if they have to do with: a)
territory, peace, alliances, political and military issues; b)
freedoms, human rights and obligations of citizens as are
provided in the Constitution; c) membership of the Republic of
Albania in international organizations; d) the undertaking of
financial obligations by the Republic of Albania; e) the approval,
amendment, supplementing or repeal of laws. The Assembly
may, with a majority of all its members, ratify other
international agreements that are not contemplated in

11
12

E.g., MALANCZUK, supra note 3, at 130–147.
Id. at 126.
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paragraph 1 of this article.13

Based upon this provision, three arguments can be made.
First, international agreements concerning the fields of
territory, peace, alliances, political and military issues, human
rights
and
freedoms,
membership
in
international
organizations, financial obligations, and treaties changing
domestic laws should be ratified by the Albanian Parliament.14
In other words, any treaties pertaining to these areas cannot be
legally binding without first going through a parliamentary
ratification procedure. That is, the Albanian Parliament is
vested with the power to provide the instrument of ratification
in the aforementioned fields, with ratification acting as the
main instrument of international law.15 Second, in addition to
having the right to ratify treaties, the Albanian Parliament has
the right to denounce them as well.
Hence, only the
Parliament can denounce an international treaty concerning
one or more of these areas. Third, as prescribed by the
Constitution, the instrument of ratification provided by the
Parliament in these fields is produced by law. In this regard,
the ratification procedure according to the Albanian
Constitution can be attained only through an enacted law. The
13 KUSHTETUTA E REPUBLIKËS SE SHQIPËISË [CONSTITUTION OF THE
REPUBLIC OF ALBANIA] Oct. 21, 1998, art. 121(1)–(2).
14 See Eur. Comm’n. for Democracy Through Law, Draft Comparative
Study of National Solutions to the Question of the Relationship Between
International and Domestic Law and Recommendations Relating Thereto:
Slovak Republic, Doc. No. CDL(1993)052e-restr (Nov. 9, 1993) [hereinafter
Eur. Comm’n. for Democracy Through Law, Draft Comparative Study] (noting,
some constitutions, such as that of Slovakia, give the power of ratification of
treaties to the President of the Republic. In order for the President of the
Republic to ratify an international agreement, however, the President must
first get the consent of the parliament).
15 See Eur. Comm’n. for Democracy Through Law, Draft Comparative
Study of National Solutions to the Question of the Relationship Between
International and Domestic Law and Recommendations Relating Thereto,
Doc. No. CDL(1993)024e-restr (May 19, 1993) (by Constantin P. Economides)
(noting that the Albanian Parliament is vested with the power to ratify
treaties falling in the fields concerned. Ratification, as opposed to
parliamentary approval, is an instrument of international law and signifies
that the country has taken the international obligation over the ratified
treaty. Some states vest the head of state or government with ratification
powers, but prior to ratifying a treaty, the head of state or government must
get the approval of the Parliament. In this case, the act of approval is a
measure of domestic law and does not produce any international
consequence).
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law of ratification is issued in a regular law-making procedure,
as provided for by the Constitution of Albania. In sum,
ratifying treaties in these specified areas rests with the
Albanian Parliament; ratification confers on the Parliament
the right to make or refuse internationally binding obligations.
Albania’s Constitution, as seen in Article 121, also gives
the Parliament the right to ratify treaties that do not fall in the
areas mentioned in the provision.16 As a result, the Parliament
is vested with the power to prohibit the President and/or the
government from ratifying a treaty falling outside the
concerned areas, unless the Parliament itself gives
authorization. Article 121, thus, has the effect of giving the
Parliament discretionary power over the President and/or
government by affirming a treaty’s provisions solely through
the act of signing. This result leaves questions unanswered:
how does a treaty falling outside the parameters laid out in the
provision become ratified? According to the Constitution of
Albania, who has the authority to negotiate and formulate
treaties? Of course, treaty-making refers only to the act of
negotiating and formulating a treaty, not to the act of
ratification.
So, who holds treaty-making powers and
procedures in Albanian domestic law?
From a constitutional perspective, treaty-making power is
linked to the prerogative of signing a treaty. The Albanian
Constitution establishes two different and possibly
contradictory situations with regard to the power to sign
treaties on behalf of the Republic of Albania. On the one hand,
while laying out the powers of the President, Article 92 of the
Constitution establishes that the President “signs international
agreements according to the law.”17 On the other hand, Article
121(3) of the Constitution states: “[t]he Prime Minister notifies
the Assembly whenever the Council of Ministers signs an
international agreement that is not ratified by law.”18 There
seems to be an overt conflict between these provisions
pertaining to treaty-making powers as far as the signing of
treaties is concerned.
To this extent, the Constitution
16 KUSHTETUTA E REPUBLIKËS SE SHQIPËISË [CONSTITUTION
REPUBLIC OF ALBANIA] Oct. 21, 1998, art. 121.
17 Id. art.92(h).
18 Id. art.121(3).
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references two authorities that “sign treaties,”19 adding that it
does not demarcate the border of competence between the two.
Article 92 designates the President as the authority who signs
international treaties. Article 121(3), however, seems to
endorse the Council of Ministers as the body authorized to sign
treaties, albeit passively.
Let us now observe the problem from the perspective of the
LMITAA. LMITAA, which was issued by the former
constitutional regime of Albania, contains numerous provisions
that conflict with one another.20 Yet, its legal force is
recognized by the current Constitution.21 For one thing,
LMITAA draws a distinction between the signing power of the
President of the Republic and that of the Council of Ministers.
As opposed to the current constitution, LMITAA states that if
Albania itself is subject to a treaty, then the right to negotiate
and sign it rests solely with the President.22 On the other
hand, if the government is subject to a treaty, then the
President of the Council of Ministers retains that right.23 In
either case, the foreign minister counter-signs on any treaty.24
As a result, one can argue that Article 4 of LMITAA
complicates many issues. It conflicts with the current
Constitution.
In the first case, the division between the President of the
Republic and the Council of Ministers, with regard to the right
to negotiate and sign treaties, is far from being demarcated by
19 The same overt situation appears in the Constitution of Croatia also.
The latter, in Article 139, establishes that: “[i]nternational agreements which
are not subject of ratification by the Croatian Parliament are concluded by
the President of the Republic at the proposal of the Government, or by the
Government of the Republic of Croatia.” USTAV REPUBLIKE HRVATSKE
[CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC OF CROATIA] Apr. 2, 2001, art. 139. Therefore,
the Croatian Constitution does not demarcate the border of power between
the government and President of Republic as far as the signing of treaties
that need no parliamentarian ratification is concerned.ANTHONY MOORE,
POLICE AND JUDICIAL CO-OPERATION IN THE EUROPEAN UNION: FIDE 2004
NATIONAL REPORTS 28 (Anthony Moore ed., 2004).
20 THE LAW ON MAKING INTERNATIONAL TREATIES AND AGREEMENTS OF
ALBANIA [LMITAA] art. 4.
21 KUSHTETUTA E REPUBLIKËS SE SHQIPËISË [CONSTITUTION OF THE
REPUBLIC OF ALBANIA] Oct. 21, 1998, art.178(1).
22 LMITAA art. 4.
23 Id.
24 Id.
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LMITAA. LMITAA attempts to increate a distinction between
treaties in which the subject is the Republic of Albania and
treaties in which the subject is the government of Albania.25
The problems here seem obvious. One issue is how the Republic of Albania, in its legal terminology, encompasses the
government of Albania. LMITAA, both logically and legally,
cannot demarcate the signing of treaties power of the President
of Republic, on the one hand, and the Council of Ministers, on
the other. An attempt to do so results in an awkward and
naïve solution.
Although LMITAA offers only confusion in this regard, the
Albanian Constitutional Court has ruled at least once on this
issue and, therefore, has paved the way for some clarification.
In Socialist Party v. Council of Ministers, the Albanian
Constitutional Court ruled that a treaty could not be
negotiated and signed unless the President of the Republic has
provided authorization on negotiating and signing it.26 In fact,
the Court ruled that doing so was unconstitutional.27 Further,
the Court argued that the lack of presidential authorization
contradicts the Constitution and LMITAA as well as that the
power to negotiate and sign treaties does not only derive from
Article 92 of the Constitution, but from LMITAA.28 By turning
to the President’s duty to represent the unity of the people, the
Constitutional Court ruled that in order for a treaty to be
constitutionally binding, it must be negotiated and signed on
the authorization of the President of the Republic.29 The Court
reasoned that Article 92 gave the President the right to sign
treaties and disregarded Article 121, which conferred this
power to the Council of Ministers.30
In light of Socialist Party case, one could argue that the
case was settled.31 In the end, the power to negotiate treaties
25

Id.

26.Gjykatës

Kushtetuese [Constitutional Court] Apr. 15, 2010, 52
FLETORJA ZYRTARE [OFFICIAL GAZETTE] 1875.
27 Id.
28 KUSHTETUTA E REPUBLIKËS SE SHQIPËISË [CONSTITUTION OF THE
REPUBLIC OF ALBANIA] Oct. 21, 1998, art. 92.
29 Gjykatës Kushtetuese [Constitutional Court] Apr. 15, 2010, 52
FLETORJA ZYRTARE [OFFICIAL GAZETTE] 1875.
30 Id.
31 Id.

9

2012]

ALBANIAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW

101

and to sign them rested with the President of the Republic.32
Additionally, should the Council of Ministers wish to negotiate
and ratify treaties, it must first obtain presidential
authorization or confirmation to proceed.33 We cannot go so
far, however, as to argue that LMITAA’s insistence on having
every treaty counter-signed by the foreign minister is
unconstitutional. This statement would rest on the idea that
the power to sign a treaty, as provided by the Constitution,
cannot be shared with and constrained by the foreign minister,
which would leave Article 4 of LMITAA itself utterly
unconstitutional and, thus, in conflict with the ruling of the
Albanian Constitutional Court. While the power to make and
sign treaties rests with the President of the Republic and the
Council of Ministers, the Foreign Minister still plays an
important role in facilitating the process of treaty-making.34
But what happens once a treaty is negotiated and signed?
In light of the Albanian Constitution, LMITAA, and the case
law of the Albanian Constitutional Court, we argue that after a
treaty is signed, it then goes to the Parliament for ratification
as long as it falls within the fields prescribed in Article 121. If
the treaty does not fall within the fields prescribed in Article
121, this provision and the Parliament does not require that it
be ratified; it is ipso iure, ratified when signed by the President
of Republic.
The Constitution also explores the question of whether
local governmental institutions have the right to enter into
international treaties. Article 109(4) states:
The organs of local government units have the right to form
unions and joint institutions with one another for the
representation of their interests, to cooperate with local units of
other countries, and also to be represented in international
organizations of local powers.35

In this respect, Article 109(4) seems to imply that local
government institutions have the constitutional right to join
with other international organizations whose field of work is
Id.
Id.
34 THE LAW ON FOREIGN SERVICE OF ALBANIA [LFSA] art.16(d).
35 KUSHTETUTA E REPUBLIKËS SE SHQIPËISË [CONSTITUTION
REPUBLIC OF ALBANIA] Oct. 21, 1998, art.109(4).
32
33
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local governance. While the question of whether the local
governments can be a party to an international treaty remains
unresolved in Article 109(4), LMITAA addresses this issue
head-on by claiming that local governments may be party to a
treaty that falls within the field of local governance,36 provided
that the Foreign Ministry has given its assent.37 Still, LMITAA
does not clarify whether the local government can actually sign
the treaty. In light of the Constitution and LMITAA, therefore,
one could argue that although local governments are given the
capacity to be parties to international treaties, any treaty
should still be signed and ratified by central institutions once
the local governments have finished negotiating it.38
The issue of the publication of treaties in the domestic
context is also important in light of legal certainty. Article
117(3) of the Albanian Constitution establishes that
“[i]nternational agreements that are ratified by law are
promulgated and published according to the procedures that
are provided for laws. The promulgation and publication of
other international agreements is done according to law.”39
Treaties ratified by a law should be published in the Official
Gazette. By extension, one could argue that a treaty cannot
become domestically binding unless it is published in the
Official Gazette.
What happens, then, to a treaty that, according to the
Constitution, does not have to be ratified by a law of the
Parliament? The Constitution, as noted above, determines that
this remains to be concretized by the law governing the making
of treaties. As a result, LMITAA does not contain any provision about the publication of treaties. Given the gap in
LMITAA, it would seem plausible to suggest that treaties that
do not have to be ratified through a law are not published
36 THE LAW ON MAKING INTERNATIONAL TREATIES AND AGREEMENTS OF
ALBANIA [LMITAA] art. 3.
37 Id.
38 The Bosnian Constitution, as an example, allows the federal units to
enter into international treaties if the approval of the central institutions is
taken. See generally Eur. Comm’n for Democracy Through Law, Opinion on
Responsibilities for the Conclusion and Implementation of International
Agreements under the Constitution of Bosnia And Herzegovina, Doc. No. CDLINF(1999)009 (June 21, 1999).
39 KUSHTETUTA E REPUBLIKËS SE SHQIPËISË [CONSTITUTION OF THE
REPUBLIC OF ALBANIA] Oct. 21, 1998, art.117(4).
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anywhere.40 A broad interpretation of Article 122 of the
Constitution, however, reveals that each treaty must be
published prior to becoming binding. Article 122 suggests that
in order to become binding, even treaties that do not need
parliamentarian ratification also must be published.41
THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN INTERNATIONAL
TREATIES AND DOMESTIC LEGAL ORDER
As indicated above, the ways in which international
treaties become incorporated into the domestic legal structure
are complex and often confusing. Still, the question of the
relationship between treaties and national law remains at the
heart of domestic constitutional order. While the discussion
thus far has proven how interesting this topic can be,
theoretically, it also retains importance with regard to the
actual practice of Albanian law. The case law of the Albanian
Constitutional Court proves to be compelling because it
provides a means of bridging the gap between theory and
practice.
Thus, three questions remain unanswered, namely: 1) Are
treaties and domestic law part of a single legal order, or do
they belong to two independent orders?; 2) If they do form a
single order, do treaties become automatically incorporated
into the domestic legal system upon ratification? If so, can a
legal or natural citizen rely directly on the any right or
obligation deriving from the treaty? Does this lead to directapplicability and/or direct-effect?; and 3) If treaties become
automatically incorporated into the domestic order upon
ratification, what then is the relationship between those
treaties and any other laws within the domestic legal order?42
Do the ratified treaties take higher precedence, or are they
40 Some constitutions, such as Russia’s Constitution, do not explicitly
require the publication of ratified treaties, which can lead to contesting of
legal certainty. See Gennady M. Danilenko, The New Russian Constitution
and International Law, 3 AM. J. INT’L L. 451 (1994).
41 KUSHTETUTA E REPUBLIKËS SE SHQIPËISË [CONSTITUTION OF THE
REPUBLIC OF ALBANIA] Oct. 21, 1998, art. 122.
42 See generally Ige F. Dekker & Ramses A. Wessel, Governance by
International Organizations: Rethinking the Normative Force of International
Decisions, in GOVERNANCE AND INTERNATIONAL LEGAL THEORY 215–23 (G. W.
Werner ed., 2004).
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internally constructed and passed as predominately domestic
laws? To explain these questions, we must broadly review the
Albanian constitutional spirit and provisions and then turn to
the accompanying literature.
Before addressing these questions, however, it is worth
noting that Article 5 of the Constitution of Albania establishes:
“The Republic of Albania applies international law that is
binding upon it.”43 Although Article 5 does not directly treat
the status of international law in the domestic legal order, its
importance cannot be ignored. It obliges the polity to apply
binding international law. Article 5, nevertheless, does not
regulate the manner in which the law is enacted. Instead, it
institutes the obligation to apply binding international law.
Article 5, then, makes the polity liable for those elements of
international law that should be implemented domestically and
those that must be put into practice internationally through
interacting with international actors.
In light of the scope of Article 5, we can begin to address
the question of whether treaties and Albanian domestic law
form a single or two independent legal orders. Article 116 of
the Constitution of Albania is instructive. It states that
“normative acts that are effective in the entire territory of the
Republic of Albania are: a) the Constitution; b) ratified
international agreements; c) the laws; [and] d) normative acts
of the Council of Ministers.”44 In other words, international
treaties are legally effective within Albanian territory and,
therefore, make ratified treaties part of the domestic legal
order. By its language, Article 116 suggests that there is
established in Albania a monist system that unites
international treaties and the domestic legal order.
Furthermore, this view is clarified by Article 122(1), which
asserts:
Any international agreement that has been ratified constitutes
part of the internal juridical system after it is published in the
Official Journal of the Republic of Albania. It is implemented
directly, except for cases when it is not self-executing and its
implementation requires issuance of a law. The amendment,
43 KUSHTETUTA E REPUBLIKËS SE SHQIPËISË [CONSTITUTION
REPUBLIC OF ALBANIA] Oct. 21, 1998, art. 5.
44 Id. art. 116.
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supplementing and repeal of laws approved by the majority of all
members of the Assembly, for the effect of ratifying an
international agreement, is done with the same majority. 45

Article 122(1) begins to provide solutions to the issues
brought up in this article. It complements Article 116 and
clarifies the fact that international agreements become part of
the domestic legal order upon ratification, furthering the
impression that a monist system prevails and the doctrine of
incorporation applies.46 In sum, the ratified treaty ex proprio
vigore becomes part of the Albanian domestic legal order.
Consequently, given the expressis verbis constitutional
determination, a ratified treaty, through its own power,
penetrates the Albanian domestic legal order without
necessitating any additional domestic legislative action.47
Having addressed this question, we can now turn to the issue
of direct applicability and direct effect.
Does Article 122(1) provide some clarity in regards to the
direct applicability and direct effect of international treaties?
It does by claiming that ratified treaties that have been
published in the official gazette are directly applicable.48 The
result is that no legal act need be issued to make a treaty
enforceable; it is directly integrated in the domestic legal order
and can be directly employed49 by all legal and natural persons
explicitly, an outcome which also stands in harmony with
Article 26 of LMITAA.50
The only exception to the direct applicability of treaties
established by Article 122(1) arises in a situation in which a
Id. art.122(1).
Most of the world’s constitutions incorporate treaties into the domestic
legal order. See Eric Stein, International Law in Internal Law: Toward
Internationalization of Central-Eastern European Constitutions, 88 AM. J.
INT’L L. 427, 431 (1994).
47 See the analogous case of Bulgaria. HristoDanov, Bulgaria, in Eur.
Comm’n for Democracy Through Law, Constitutional Courts and European
Integration, 19, Doc. No. CDL-STD(2002)036 (Sept. 19, 2002) [hereinafter
Eur. Comm’n for Democracy Through Law, Constitutional Courts].
48 Most European countries apply the principle of direct applicability of
treaties in the domestic legal order. SeeStein,supra note 43, at 431.
49 Constantin Economides, The Elaboration of Model Clauses on the
Relationship Between International and Domestic Law, in Eur. Comm’n. for
Democracy Through Law, International and Domestic Law, supra note 2.
50 THE LAW ON MAKING INTERNATIONAL TREATIES AND AGREEMENTS OF
ALBANIA [LMITAA] art. 26.
45
46
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treaty is not self-executing, or where a law to concretize the
treaty is required.51 Non-self-executing treaties cause many
sensitive issues, but since the Albanian Constitution does not
make clear when a treaty is considered self-executing, a legal
or natural person cannot rely directly on a treaty in
determining if it is directly applicable,52 especially since most
treaties do not advertise their own self-executing nature.53
Consequently, it is left to the local courts’ jurisdiction to decide
whether, by the standards of Article 122(1), a treaty is selfexecuting.54 The local court can deem a treaty as not directly
applicable and, thus, refuse to apply it without having specific
national legislation on the books, which, in turn, can lead to
legal uncertainty.55
Some constitutions, such as that of South Africa, oblige
domestic courts, inter alia, to interpret the question of the selfexecution of treaties in line with international legal
standards.56 This kind of provision lessens the risk of refusing
to apply an international treaty when it is not considered selfexecuting domestically and if no domestic legislation to
concretize it has been issued.
Moreover, the third problem that this article raises is the
position that ratified treaties hold within the domestic legal
hierarchy. In principle, allowing treaties to be incorporated
into the domestic legal order on the basis of parity with laws
would lead to many conflicts and challenges.57 Hence, the
51 Eyal Benvenisti, Judicial Misgivings Regarding the Application of
International Law: An Analysis of Attitudes of National Courts, 4 EUR. J.
INT’L L. 159, 162 (1993) (making this broad argument in reference to the US
experience).
52 This argument is based on the debate developed in Danilenko, supra
note 40, at 465.
53 Benvenisti, supra note 51, at 162.
54 KUSHTETUTA E REPUBLIKËS SE SHQIPËISË [CONSTITUTION OF THE
REPUBLIC OF ALBANIA] Oct. 21, 1998, art.122(1).
55 United States courts, for instance, show a tendency to refuse to
consider treaties self-executing, thus refusing to apply them unless domestic
legislation concretizing the treaty is passed. See Benvenisti, supra note 51,
at 162. For the South African experience in this regard, see John Dugard,
International Law and the South African Constitution, 1 EUR. J. INT’L L. 77,
83 (1997).
56 Dugard, supra note 55, at 84.
57 Vladen S. Vereshchetin, New Constitutions and the Old Problem of the
Relationship Between International Law and National Law, 7 EUR. J. INT’L L.
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Albanian Constitution allows no room for such challenges.
First, Article 116, which establishes that treaties exist
alongside the Constitution and laws,58 and Article 122(2),
which establishes that “[a]n international agreement that has
been ratified by law has superiority over laws of the country
that are not compatible with it,”59 resolve the issue of how
treaties become incorporated into domestic law.
Additionally, the phrasing of Article 116 leads to the
conclusion that treaties ratified by parliamentarian law (as
opposed to treaties that need no parliamentarian ratification)
stand below the Constitution in stature, but above individual
laws.60 Though this hierarchy cannot be taken as a safe basis
for arguing the position of treaties over one another, one cannot
dismiss Article 116, as Article 122(2) clarifies by unequivocally
confirming that treaties ratified by law prevail over any laws
not compatible with them.61
In assessing Article 122(2), one can argue two points: 1)
that it only ranks treaties that are ratified by a law—i.e. those
that need to be ratified by Parliament—within the fields
specified in Article 121(1);62 and 2) that it makes treaties
prevail over laws that are inconsistent with them without
specifying whether or not this includes only the laws issued
prior to the ratification of the treaty or those passed
subsequently as well. In sum, Article 122(2) ranks treaties
that have been ratified by a law of the Parliament over
inconsistent laws,63 but simultaneously sets treaties that are
considered ratified by the signature of the President of the
Republic of Albania on the same level with the laws of the
country. As a result, the case law of ordinary courts of Albania
29, 37 (1996).
58 KUSHTETUTA E REPUBLIKËS SE SHQIPËRISË [CONSTITUTION OF THE
REPUBLIC OF ALBANIA] Oct. 21, 1998, art. 116.
59 Id. art.122(2).
60 Some jurisdictions set treaties over inconsistent laws by establishing
the lex posterior derogat priori rule. This only rules out inconsistent laws at
the time of ratification of the treaty; however, it does not rule out subsequent
laws.See Economides, supra note 49.
61 Most constitutions, however, admit this. Id.
62 The Estonian Constitution, for instance, asserts that all treaties
prevail over laws. See Uno Löhmus, Estonia, inEur. Comm’n. for Democracy
Through Law, Constitutional Courts, supra note 47, at 35.
63 La Pergola, supra note 2.
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proves that Albanian courts have accepted the idea of treaties
prevailing over laws.64
The last issue that remains is the question of the place of
international organizations’ norms within the Albanian
domestic legal order.
Article 122(3) of the Constitution
addresses this issue by stating: “[t]he norms issued by an
international organization have superiority, in case of conflict,
over the laws of the country if the agreement ratified by the
Republic of Albania for its participation in the organization
expressly contemplates their direct applicability.”65
Article 122(3), therefore, mandates that the norms of
international organizations in which Albania is a party—
assuming that the treaty of accession provides for the direct
applicability of the norms concerned—have superiority over
internal laws.66
In this context, the norms issued by
international organizations stand equal to international
treaties ratified by a parliamentarian law. Moreover, the term
“norm” unreservedly refers to a judicial decision by an
international judicial body. Admittedly, Article 122(3) eases
the integration in a supranational organization, whose
communitarian norms must have prevalence over the laws of
the member state. With this in mind, Article 122(3) leaves the
gate open for the option of joining a supranational institution,
like the European Union, without the constitutional
implications allowing primacy of the European Communities’
law.
At the same time, Article 123 establishes, “The Republic of
Albania, on the basis of international agreements, delegates to
international organizations state powers for specific issues.”67
The Assembly may decide that the ratification of such an
64 Gjykata e Lartë [Supreme Court] Sept. 27, 2002, 3 FLETORJA ZYRTARE
[OFFICIAL GAZETTE] 1649; Gjykata e Lartë [Supreme Court] Oct. 5, 2002, 5
FLETORJA ZYRTARE [OFFICIAL GAZETTE] 1769.
65 KUSHTETUTA E REPUBLIKËS SE SHQIPËISË [CONSTITUTION OF THE
REPUBLIC OF ALBANIA] Oct. 21, 1998, art.122(3).
66 Many constitutions, such as that of Slovakia, do not regulate the issue
of international organizations’ norms in the face of domestic law. Eur.
Comm’n. for Democracy Through Law, Draft Comparative Study, supra note
14.
67 KUSHTETUTA E REPUBLIKËS SE SHQIPËISË [CONSTITUTION OF THE
REPUBLIC OF ALBANIA] Oct. 21, 1998, art.123(1).
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agreement be done through a referendum.”68 As such, Article
123 authorizes the polity to transfer parts of the country’s
sovereignty to an international organization, an act that must
be accomplished through an international treaty.
The transfer of state powers to international organizations,
according to the Statute of Rome case heard in Albanian
Constitutional Court,69 cannot undermine the country’s
constitutional identity,70 meaning that permission to delegate
state powers to an international organization is limited to the
extent that it does not deform the constitutional and sovereign
identity of the Albanian polity. Building upon this provision,
the Constitutional Court has argued that Albania enters into
international agreements only as a sovereign party,71 thus
supplementing Article 123. It is important to note that the
issue of delegating sovereignty may not, in light of the Statute
of Rome case, limit the sovereign character of the polity or its
ability to enter into treaties because delegation of sovereignty
to international organizations may not be imposed externally.
Still, the delegation of sovereignty for purposes of modern
integration is an approach that has been de facto acknowledged
by the Albanian constitutional justice.72 On the other hand,
Article 123 of the Constitution lets us contend that, though the
transfer of powers to an international organization is
permitted, the power transferred does automatically prevent
the Albanian polity from issuing norms for the transferred
power. Overall, Article 123 makes it possible for the polity to
enter into international treaties that contain the duty to

Id. art.123(3).
See Eur. Comm’n for Democracy Through Law, Draft Report on CaseLaw Regarding The Supremacy Of International Human Rights Treaties, 4–5,
Doc. No. CDL-DI(2004)005 (Oct. 22, 2004).
70 The French Constitutional Council, while reviewing the constitutionality of the Statute of Rome, found that the case conflicts with the
Constitution (contrary to how the Albanian Constitutional Court ruled);
hence, the Constitutional Council of France ruled that the Constitution must
be amended. See, Eur. Comm’n for Democracy Through Law, Draft Report on
the Constitutional Issues Raised by the Ratification of the Rome Statute, Doc.
No. CDL-AD(2008)031 (Oct. 10, 2008).
71 Gjykatës Kushtetuese [Constitutional Court] Sept. 23, 2002, 32
FLETORJA ZYRTARE [OFFICIAL GAZETTE] 1299.
72 Id.
68
69
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delegatesovereign powers to an international organization,73
which coincides with the needs of current trends in global
integration.74
THE ISSUE OF TREATIES’ CONSTITUTIONAL REVIEW
AND LEGAL CONSISTENCY WITH PREVAILING TREATIES
Following Article 122(1) of the Constitution of Albania, it
seems clear that international treaties take precedence over
Albanian laws, but that treaties must still be subordinate to
the Constitution.75 This notion raises important questions
regarding the existence of mechanisms that review the
constitutionality of treaties, since they must be constitutional.76
This rule is also complicated by the fact that, while treaties
remain subordinate to the Constitution, Article 122(1) makes it
clear that treaties prevail over the laws of the country, which
leaves the need for a mechanism that can assure that laws
inconsistent with treaties are avoided.
This part of the article, therefore, addresses two matters:
1) the issue of the constitutional review of treaties; and 2) the
issue of assuring the precedence of treaties over inconsistent
laws. In principle, one could argue that several mechanisms
exist that can assure the consistency between treaties and
73 For the requirement of the Venice Commission in this regard, see Eur.
Comm’n for Democracy Through Law, Opinion on the Constitution of Serbia,
Doc. No. CDL-AD(2007)004 (Mar. 19, 2007) [hereinafter Eur. Comm’n for
Democracy Through Law, Constitution of Serbia].
74 Louis Lopez Guerra, Concluding Report, in Eur. Comm’n for
Democracy Through Law, European Integration and Constitutional Law, Doc.
No. CDL-STD(2000)030 (Sept. 30, 2000). The Constitution of Turkey, for
instance, does not allow the transfer of sovereignty. See, Christian Rumph,
Turkish Constitutional Law and the European Union from a European Point
of View, in Eur. Comm’n for Democracy Through Law, Constitutional
Implications of Accession to the European Union, Doc. No. CDL-STD(2002)03
(Nov. 10, 2001).
75 We use here the term “treaty” as a treaty ratified by law in light of Art.
122(1) of the Constitution of Albania, thus leaving aside treaties that need no
parliamentarian ratification, given that in the latter case, treaties
presumably have the rank of laws.
76 The Croatian Constitution, for instance, assigns no power to the
Constitutional Court to check the constitutionality of treaties. See, Eur.
Comm’n. for Democracy Through Law, The Constitutional Court of the
Republic of Croatia and International Law, Doc. No. CDL(96)34 (May 29,
1996) (by S. Rodin).
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domestic legislation. These consist of an a priori control of the
constitutionality of treaties, an incorporation of a clause into
the laws that establishes that the law will be applied only if it
is in harmony with binding treaties, an interpretation of laws
in the spirit of treaties so that they remain consistent with
treaties and their targets, and an a posteriori control of the
constitutionality of treaties alongside an a priori control of the
consistency of the draft-laws with binding international
treaties.77
As far as the first question is concerned, the Constitution
of Albania authorizes the Constitutional Court to decide
questions of “compatibility of international agreements with
the Constitution, prior to their ratification.”78 In such cases,
the procedure before the Constitutional Court can be initiated
only by one of the following: “a) the President of the Republic;
b) the Prime Minister; c) no less than one-fifth of the deputies;
f) the People’s Advocate; g) organs of the local government; h)
organs of religious communities; [or] i) political parties and
other organizations.”79 If the Constitutional Court decides to
bring the case in a plenary session, then the ratification
procedure is immediately suspended.80 After that, the Court is
obliged to reach a decision within a month, but if the treaty is
considered unconstitutional, its ratification is prohibited.81
As observed above, the review of constitutionality of
international treaties rests with the Constitutional Court.82
Still, the Parliament, the President, and the government can
review the constitutionality of a treaty during the treatyEconomides, supra note 49.
KUSHTETUTA E REPUBLIKËS SE SHQIPËISË [CONSTITUTION OF THE
REPUBLIC OF ALBANIA] Oct. 21, 1998, art. 131.
79 Id. art.134; LAW ON THE ORGANIZATION AND FUNCTIONING OF THE
CONSTITUTIONAL COURT OF THE REPUBLIC OF ALBANIA [LOFCCA] Feb. 10,
2000, art. 52.
80 LOFCCA art. 52.
81 Id. The Estonian Constitution, for instance, prohibits the polity from
entering into treaties that conflict with the Constitution; this prohibition is
another mode of upholding the supremacy of the Constitution vis-à-vis
treaties. See Löhmus, supra note 62, at 39.
82 Though the Constitution prevails over laws, one should not aim at
interpreting the Constitution against international law. For the suggestions
of the Venice Commission, see Eur. Comm’n for Democracy Through Law,
Constitution of Serbia, supra note 73.
77
78
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making and ratification process—independent of the
Constitutional Court’s jurisdiction—and make it comply with
the constitution of the polity. In view of that, there is evidence
that shows that the Parliament itself has been involved in
ruling out laws that contradict international treaties.83
The power of the Constitutional Court to control the
constitutionality of a treaty, however, is limited. As observed
above, the Albanian Constitutional Court only has preventive
jurisdiction over the constitutionality of treaties,84 which
means it cannot call a treaty unconstitutional after the
ratification instrument has been provided on behalf of the
Republic of Albania. The power to exercise preventive control
over the constitutionality of a treaty, as a result, assures that
an international obligation is constitutionally reviewed prior to
ratification, and that, when ratified, it cannot be banned
anymore.85 The preemptive constitutional review of treaties, as
such, contributes to legal certainty—as opposed to repressive
constitutional control.86
On the other hand, one can observe that the number of
actors that can raise the issue of the constitutionality of a
treaty before the Constitutional Court is pretty broad, with
only individuals barred from raising the question. Overall, it is
possible to review treaties’ constitutionality under the auspices
of the Constitution of Albania within the Constitutional Court’s
jurisdiction, but yet the Parliament, the President of the
Republic, and the government can control the constitutionality
of treaties in the treaty-making and ratification phase as well.
In exceptional cases, the Constitutional Court can still use
the prerogative of annulling an international treaty a
posteriori87 by declaring unconstitutional the law used to ratify
Gjykatës Kushtetuese [Constitutional Court] Sept. 23, 2002, 32
FLETORJA ZYRTARE [OFFICIAL GAZETTE] 1299.
84 For more about the suggestion to establish only a priori constitutional
review of treaties, see Eur. Comm’n for Democracy Through Law,
Constitution of Serbia, supra note 73.
85 KUSHTETUTA E REPUBLIKËS SE SHQIPËISË [CONSTITUTION OF THE
REPUBLIC OF ALBANIA] Oct. 21, 1998, art. 131; cf. Eur. Comm’n for Democracy
Through Law, Constitution of Serbia, supra note 73.
86 See Tomasz Dybowski, The Role of the Constitutional Tribunal in the
Interpretation of International Law in Poland, in Eur. Comm’n for Democracy
Through Law, International and Domestic Law, supra note 2.
87 Eur. Comm’n for Democracy Through Law, Constitution of Serbia,
83
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the treaty under the jurisdiction of controlling the
constitutionality of laws themselves.88 This step, however,
would constitute a breach of Article 46 of the Vienna
Convention on the Law of Treaties89 and could be seen as
judicially arbitrary and a misuse of power by the court. Such
action would only invalidate the treaty obligation domestically,
though it would not discharge the international liability of the
state for the application of that treaty.90
As noted above, the second issue begs the question of
consistency between laws and treaties or, more particularly,
whether or not the Albanian constitutional system assures that
laws contradicting treaties are ruled out from the domestic
legal order. This question is directly linked to the prescription
of Article 122(1), which asserts that treaties prevail over
inconsistent laws.91 As such, Article 131 of the Constitution
allows the Constitutional Court of Albania, inter alia, to rule on
the: “a) compatibility of the law with the Constitution or with
international agreements as provided in article 122; and b)
compatibility of normative acts of the central and local organs
with the Constitution and international agreements.”92 The
right to initiate control over the consistency of a law with an
internationally binding treaty belongs to the President of the
Republic, the Prime Minister, at least one-fifth of the deputies
of Parliament, the Chairman of the High State Audit, the
People’s Advocate, local authorities, religious institutions,
political parties, and other organizations.93
To this extent, one could argue that, in light of Article 131,
the Constitutional Court is vested with a posteriori jurisdiction
to rule out laws and other normative acts that contradict any
international treaty binding in Albania. This provision further
empowers the standing of treaties over laws as laid out in
supra note 73.
88 See Danilenko, supra note 40; see also Balkin, supra note 8.
89 See Eur. Comm’n for Democracy Through Law, Constitution of Serbia,
supra note 73.
90 See John H. Jackson, Status of Treaties in Domestic Legal Systems: A
Policy Analysis, 86 AM. J. INT’L L. 310 (2003); see also Guerra, supra note 74.
91 KUSHTETUTA E REPUBLIKËS SE SHQIPËISË [CONSTITUTION OF THE
REPUBLIC OF ALBANIA] Oct. 21, 1998, art.122(1).
92 Id. art. 131.
93 LAW ON THE ORGANIZATION AND FUNCTIONING OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL
COURT OF THE REPUBLIC OF ALBANIA [LOFCCA] Feb. 10, 2000, art. 49.
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Article 122(1) by providing the mechanism to ensure that
domestic laws incompatible with treaties are ruled out. At the
same time, the number of actors authorized to initiate the
procedure for controlling the consistency of laws with an
international treaty is very broad, leading to the conclusion
that the process of seeking to address questions of consistency
is rather open from a constitutional justice point of view.
Within the Constitution of Albania, however, there is an
exception to the principle of preventive control of
constitutionality of treaties. Article 180 of the Albanian
Constitution—adopted in 1998—establishes that treaties
ratified prior to its adoption remain in force, but vests the
Council of Ministers with the power to bring before the
Constitutional Court treaties ratified before 1998 and in
As a result, the
conflict with the new Constitution.94
Constitutional Court can ban treaties ratified before 1998 with
an a posteriori jurisdiction if it finds them unconstitutional.95
This exception is the only one provided for, however, in terms
of the review of a treaty’s constitutionality after its ratification.
Still, the solution found in Article 180 puts treaties ratified
prior to 1998 into conformity with the new constitutional order
and its supremacy, which is logically acceptable.
PACTA SUNT SERVANDA AND THE GOOD FAITH
APPLICATION OF INTERNATIONAL TREATIES
The principle of pacta sunt servanda and the application,
in good faith, of binding treaties remain essential to the
concern over the relationship between international law and
national law. In the first instance, it is worth noting that the
Constitution of Albania provides for neither specific nor
general provisions that might explicitly constitute the
responsibility to the pacta sunt servanda principle and
application in good faith of international treaties. The only
relevant constitutional provision that might apply is Article 5,
which prescribes that the Republic of Albania must apply
binding international law.96 With this in mind, the relevance of
94 KUSHTETUTA E REPUBLIKËS SE SHQIPËISË [CONSTITUTION
REPUBLIC OF ALBANIA] Oct. 21, 1998, art.180(2).
95 Id. art.180.
96 Id. art. 5.
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these principles should be investigated in light of constitutional
justice and the case law of the Constitutional Court, while
paying attention to the Vienna Convention on the Law of
Treaties.97
According to the Vienna Convention on the Law of
Treaties, the pacta sunt servanda principle is binding over all
of its signatories.98 Article 27 flatly states that states cannot
invoke domestic legal actions to invalidate an international
obligation as stipulated in a treaty.99 An exception to Article
27 of the Vienna Convention does appear in Article 46, which
allows states to invoke national rules that invalidate the
instrument of ratification of an international treaty, but only if
the rule concerned is of crucial importance to the domestic legal
order.100 The other customary exception, the principle of rebus
sic stantibus, allows states to invalidate international
obligations if circumstances change and the meaning of those
international obligations have lost their rationale.101
In
principle, though pacta sunt servanda and application in good
faith of treaties are interrelated, the former highlights the
state’s international responsibility, whereas the latter shows
the domestic accountability in the application of a treaty.
Simply put, however, the two should be understood as two
prongs of the same issue: that is, a state’s responsibility to
apply international obligations.
To begin with, since the Vienna Convention on the Law of
Treaties is part of the domestic legal order of Albania,102 one
could argue that the pacta sunt servanda principle is already a
domestic legal obligation. Additionally, LMITAA obliges every
institution to observe the application of treaties and to report
on the vitality of their application.103 Though the law does not
97 See ANDREW T. GUZMAN, HOW INTERNATIONAL LAW WORKS: A RATIONAL
CHOICE THEORY 71–72 (2008).
98 Vienna Convention, supra note 10, art. 26.
99 Id. art. 27; see Eur. Comm’n for Democracy Through Law, Law and
Foreign Policy, Doc. No. CDL-STD(1997)024 (Sept. 27, 1997).
100 Vienna Convention, supra note 10, art. 46.
101 Id.
102 See Republika e Shqipërisë [Republic of Albania], MINISTRA E
PUNËVËTË JASHTME [MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS], http://www.mfa.gov.al/
index.php (last visited Feb. 17, 2012).
103 THE LAW ON MAKING INTERNATIONAL TREATIES AND AGREEMENTS OF
ALBANIA [LMITAA] art. 4.
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impose any further obligation, one could question whether or
not any other constitutional provision applies the pacta
suntservanda principle.
The Albanian Constitution, for one, has no further
mechanism to uphold pacta sunt servanda. Besides, it does not
comment, for instance, on whether or not the Constitutional
Court may label as unconstitutional acts that invalidate
international obligations.104 In light of Article 121(4) of the
Constitution and Article 27 of LMITAA, it seems that any
denunciation of international treaties can be undertaken
without
explicit
prohibition,
though
the
Albanian
Constitutional Court has argued that domestic measures
cannot prevent the country to comply with international law,105
adding that there is no mechanism to prevent the polity from
instituting domestic legal measures that denounce an
international treaty of which Albania is a party.106
The only references to such an occurrence, then, remain in
the Vienna Convention, which—given that Albania is a party to
it—comprises part of the domestic legal order. Of course, this
argument leads to the problem that the legal provisions that
allow the denunciation of international treaties provided by
LMITAA in Article 27 contradict the Vienna Convention on the
Law of Treaties, which means that the only logical conclusion
is that the Vienna Convention provisions constitute part of the
domestic Albanian law and, thus, prevail over the provisions of
LMITAA.
Additionally, the Constitution prevails over the Vienna
Convention on the domestic front and does not provide the
means for any denunciation, but only refers to LMITAA, which
must regulate it. Ultimately, then, the principle of pacta sunt
servanda and the applicationin good faith of international
treaties can be considered domestic principles only in light of
the penetration of the Vienna Convention on the Law of
Treaties into the Albanian domestic legal order, since the
Constitution provides no particular insight into this issue. The
KUSHTETUTA E REPUBLIKËSSË KOSOVËS [CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC
OF KOSOVO] June 15, 2008, art. 114(3)–(4).
104

105 Gjykatës Kushtetuese [Constitutional Court] Sept. 23, 2002, 32
FLETORJA ZYRTARE [OFFICIAL GAZETTE] 1299.
106 Id.
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lack of repressive jurisdiction to control the constitutionality of
treaties, however, does signify an implicit acceptance of Article
27 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties by the
Constitution of Albania.
CONCLUSION
This article addresses the issue of the relationship between
treaties and the Albanian domestic legal order. While the
article approaches the issue mainly from a constitutional law
perspective, it also addresses international law. Using existing
scholarship and specific case studies, the article’s findings
reveal themselves to be both tangible and convincing. They
help expose the complicated situations created by the
intricacies of Albanian law and, by broadly interpreting current
legal frameworks, seek to produce logically and legally correct
conclusions.
Overall, this article addressed five main questions:
As to the first question—of the power to negotiate and
formulate a treaty—it is clear that authority rests in the hands
of the Albanian Council of Ministers and the President of the
Republic, who has the power to sign treaties. Through a
legally-logical argument, the article concludes that the
negotiation, formulation, and signing of treaties—which
constitute the treaty-making powers in narrow terms—cannot
be conducted without the permission of the President of
Republic, though the Council of Ministers can engage in
negotiating, formulating, and signing activities. The Albanian
Constitutional Court welcomes the same conclusion based on
the case of Socialist Party v. Council of Ministers. On the other
hand, the ratification of treaties rests with the Albanian
Parliament, though its power is limited to certain specified
legal fields. If a given treaty falls outside the fields mentioned
in the Constitution, the treaty can be considered ratified after
being signed by the President of Republic.
As to the second question—of the relationship between
treaties and the domestic legal order—this article concludes
that Albanian constitutional law provides for a monist model of
the relationship between international treaties and national
law. International treaties, upon ratification, become ex proprio vigore, part of the domestic legal order and directly
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applicable. As a result, treaties ratified by law take precedence
over inconsistent laws.
As to the third question—of the constitutional review of
treaties and the review of the consistency between laws and
international treaties—it appears that the Albanian
Constitutional Court is vested with the power to check a priori
the constitutionality of treaties and a posteriori the consistency
of laws with prevailing international treaties. This job can be
unreservedly exercised by the Parliament as well.
As to the fourth question—of whether constitutional law
and the law of treaties provide for any mechanism that would
uphold the principle of pacta sunt servanda domestically—this
article concludes that the Constitution and relevant laws
barely address this issue. Hence, only the penetration of the
ratified Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties can be
considered as a source for explaining this phenomenon.
Finally, the article ends with the assertion that the
relationship between treaties and domestic law in the case of
Albania is to a certain extent modern, even if its regulation is
not entirely clear. The findings of the article, as a result, can
help facilitate Albanian constitutional justice to address the
issue of the rapport between international treaties and the
domestic legal order in a theoretically informed and inclusive
manner.
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